International Affairs and the British defence and security policy debate: the bibliometric context

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Introduction

With the notion of learning from the past in mind, this virtual issue contains 16 articles drawn from the *International Affairs* archive that provide insights into key aspects of British defence and security policy. This introductory article serves two purposes. First, it draws on the results of a quantitative bibiometric study to describe and assess the contribution that *International Affairs* has made to the postwar UK defence and security debate. In doing so, it demonstrates how the journal has been, and continues to be, the primary locus of scholarly academic debates and a hub for the dissemination of policy-relevant research on national defence and security issues. Second, it draws on the bibliometric study to explain the criteria for the selection of the subsequent articles, placing them within the context of the following five enduring debates:

1. Defence strategy and policy
2. Defence reviews
3. Civil–military–societal relations
4. Nuclear debate
5. The impact of outside 'events' - Scottish independence referendum and Brexit

The salience of *International Affairs* in the British defence and security debate

Perhaps not surprisingly, during the first three decades after *International Affairs* was founded in 1922 the editors placed their emphasis on publishing articles on international politics. However, during the early 1950s attention turned to British defence policy issues and, in the years that followed, the engagement of *International Affairs* with this area of study has grown exponentially. A consequence is that the articles included in this virtual edition represent a fraction of the much larger body of scholarly contributions to British defence and security policy analysis and debate in the journal since the first decade after the Second World War.

In the process of selecting these articles an attempt was made to estimate the relative significance of *International Affairs* as a forum for rigorous academic and policy-relevant research into defence, security and the British state. A quantitative bibliometric survey was employed to identify the total population of articles on British defence and security policy published in academic peer reviewed journals. Seven online data sources—Ebsco, Proquest, Military Policy Research, Taylor & Francis, SAGE Journals, Wiley Journals, Oxford Journals—were used to identify articles published in English between 1950 and 2014. These databases were selected because they are interdisciplinary and cover all major publication types. The databases were searched for articles containing the key words 'UK, United Kingdom, Great Britain, defence, defence policy, security, national security, defence strategy, security strategy, Strategic Defence and Security Review, SDSR, defence management' in the title, abstract or full text. The selection of these key words followed the assumption that it 'essentially permitted authors to self-select their work for review' on the grounds that authors who would want their work to be considered part of the British defence and security policy literature would foreground at least one of these terms in their text.[1]

[1] T. A. P. Sinclair, 'Implementation theory and practice: uncovering Policy and Administrative Linkages in the 1990s', *International Journal of Public Administration* 24: 1, 2001, p. 81.

The survey results are presented in Table 1. They show that articles on British defence and security policy where published in a total of 77 different academic peer reviewed journal titles between 1950 and 2014. The articles were concentrated in 16 'core' journals which accounted for approximately 70 per cent of all articles published. *International Affairs* was the largest publisher over the survey period, accounting for 16 per cent (n=56) of all peer reviewed articles and an average publication rate of just under one article per year. When measured against the criteria of scale and frequency of publication *International Affairs* can therefore claim, with some justification, to have been the primary locus for post-1945 academic British defence and security policy research and debate.

Table 1. Articles on British defence policy published in academic peer reviewed journals, 1950-2014

Journal title	*Number of articles published, 1950–2014*	*Percentage of all articles published, 1950–2014*	*Average number of articles published per year*[1]
International Affairs	56	16.0 %	0.9
Survival	38	10.9 %	0.7
The Political Quarterly	26	7.4 %	0.4
Defence & Security Analysis	22	6.3 %	0.8
Defence Studies	21	6.0 %	1.6
Journal of Strategic Studies	15	4.3 %	0.4
Contemporary Security Policy	12	3.4 %	0.3
Public Administration	12	3.4 %	0.2
Round Table	11	3.1 %	0.2
Foreign Affairs	9	2.6 %	0.1
British Journal of Politics and International Relations	8	2.3 %	0.5
European Security	8	2.3 %	0.4
Review of International Studies	7	2.0 %	0.2
Security Dialogue	6	1.7 %	0.1
Defence & Peace Economics	5	1.4 %	0.2
Armed Forces & Society	4	1.1 %	0.1
Remaining 61 peer reviewed journals[2]	90	30.1 %	-

[1] This column provides an indication of 'publication intensity', measured as the average number of articles on British defence and security published in a journal per year. It is calculated by dividing the total number of articles published by a journal since 1950 by the number of years the journal has been in existence since 1950.
[2] See Annex 1 for a full list of the peer reviewed journal titles identified in the survey.

The survey also provided insights into the profile and cumulative development of post-1950 British defence and security policy research published in *International Affairs*, which has informed the selection of contributions for this virtual issue. As Figure 1 shows, more than half of the articles have been published since 2005. In part, this profile reflects the slow growth in the development of defence and strategic studies research and teaching in British universities

between 1945 and the mid-1960s.[2] It is also attributable to the journal's wider focus on international and regional security studies throughout the Cold War, which meant that articles on domestic defence and security issues were published only intermittently. However, the most significant aspect of this profile is that since 2005 *International Affairs* has emerged as the foremost peer-reviewed journal in which academic research into British defence and security policy has been published, and where key policy-relevant issues have been debated.

Figure 1: Number of British defence and security policy publications in International Affairs by time period



Sub-themes in the defence debate in *International Affairs*

The preponderance of more recent works in this virtual edition is partly a function of the greater number of published articles on British defence and security issues in *International Affairs* over the last decade (Figure 1). Over the past sixty years, contributions to the journal on British defence and security policy have emerged as landmark texts within a series of policy sub-themes. The selection of more recent works also reflects a deliberate decision to select articles that provide syntheses of cumulative developments in the sub-themes making up the wider British defence and security debate. This section provides an extended introduction to each of these sub-themes analysed in the subsequent collection of articles.

Theme 1: Defence strategy and policy

Questions concerning Britain's place in the world, the role of its defence and the armed forces, and debates surrounding its relative decline as a military power have formed a fairly consistent sub-theme throughout the post-1945 period. Four texts from *International Affairs* have been selected for this virtual issue because of their significant and enduring impact on academic and practitioner debates.

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[2] For and extended discussion, see: B. Bond, 'Defence and the British Public', *Brassey's Annual*: 80-88, 1967; M. Edmondsand A. J. R. Groom, 'British defence policy since 1945', in R. Higham, R., ed., *A guide to the sources of British military history* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972); and A. G. Jones and J. Hackett,'The organization of defence studies', *RUSI Journal* 109: 634, 1964, pp. 99–110.

Of the articles to emerge in the first two decades after the Second World War Noble Frankland's 1957 article,[3] written while he was an Official Historian to the Cabinet Office, was perhaps the most significant. Written in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis and the publication of the Sandys defence review, the article considered whether there had been what we would now call a 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) and what this meant for the Britain.[4] Other articles followed in *International Affairs*, including a dedicated special edition on the 'East of Suez' question in 1966,[5] which culminated in Phillip Darby's article that looked beyond the retrenchment decision of the Wilson government.[6] This questioning of the Britain's strategy, policy and place in the world was reignited after the end of the Cold War with articles by Christopher Coker and Christopher Bellamy in 1992.[7] The RMA debate and the role of Britain's armed forces was revisited in light of the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions through a series of articles evaluating the effectiveness with which the military transformed itself to deal with these conflicts.[8] Frankland's article is included herebecause of its foundational role in framing longer-term debates over Britain's faith in new technology and policy responses to defence retrenchment in light of financial constraints.

The second selected text, John Baylis's 1986 article entitled "'Greenwoodery" and British defence policy',[9] arguably provided the first major examination of British defence policy in the round and the 'declinist debate' dominating accounts of Britain's post-1945 adjustment from Great Power status. Unusually, Baylis undertook this examination using the lens of the work of the late defence economist David Greenwood. On the one hand, Baylis highlighted how Greenwood had sought to undermine the then conventional wisdom that:

> Any reader of books or articles on British defence policy in the period since 1945 is likely to be struck by the consensus which seems to exist about the general trend and direction of policy. Titles like *The long retreat*, *The long recessional* and *The collapse of British power* reveal a commonly held view that the United Kingdom's postwar security policy has been characterized by a continuous process of contraction and decline.[10]

Greenwood's alternative thesis was that the declinist argument was too simplistic and ignored the qualitative dimension in the development of successive generations of weapons systems. Though supporting much of Greenwood's interpretation, the value of Baylis's analysis lay in its identification of flaws in the revisionist thesis and his identification of the critical role of 'muddling through' in the British defence decision making process as it adapted perennial resource constraints.

The enduring significance of Baylis' work is evident in the third text, Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman's 2009 article titled 'Blair's wars and Brown's budgets', which set in train the ongoing debate on whether the Ministry of Defence and government more generally can think and act

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[3] Britain's changing strategic position, Noble Frankland, *International Affairs* 33: 4, Oct., 1957, pp. 416–26.
[4] 'Defence: outline of future policy', *Cmd. 124* (London: HMSO, 1957).
[5] Included in this volume was Michael Howard, 'Britain's strategic problem East of Suez', *International Affairs*42: 2, April 1966, pp. 179–83.
[6] Phillip Darby, 'Beyond East of Suez', *International Affairs* 46: 4, Oct. 1970, pp. 655–69.
[7] Christopher Bellamy, 'Soldier of fortune: Britain's new military role', *International Affairs* 68: 3, 1992, pp. 443–56; Christopher Coker, 'Britain and the New World Order: the special relationship in the 1990s', *International Affairs* 68: 3, 1992, pp. 407-21.
[8] See Theo Farrell, The dynamics of British military transformation', *International Affairs* 84: 4, July 2008, pp. 777–807; Stuart Griffin, 'Iraq, Afghanistan and the future of British military doctrine: from counterinsurgency to Stabilization', *International Affairs* 87: 2, March 2011, pp. 317–333; Robert Foley, Stuart Griffin and Helen McCartney, 'Transformation in contact': learning the lessons of modern war', *International Affairs* 87: 2, March 2011, pp. 253–70.
[9] John Baylis, "'Greenwoodery" and British defence policy', *International Affairs* 62: 3, Summer 1986, pp. 443–57.
[10] John Baylis, "'Greenwoodery'", p. 443.

strategically.[11] The 2009 article effectively introduced the 'ends, ways and means'-based analysis that has dominated subsequent examinations of British defence and security policy. Its final line—'In short, we argue that defence policy, planning and analysis in the United Kingdom has reached a state of organizational, bureaucratic and intellectual decay'—caused uproar in a way few other articles have.[12] Cornish and Dorman's analysis owed much to Baylis's original diagnosis of decision-making constraints in British defence policy-making and the potential remedies that might accrue through 'smart muddling through'.

The academic and practitioner impact of Cornish and Dorman's work was evident in Hew Strachan's article in *Survival* that soon followed as the original article did the rounds in Whitehall and was incorporated in the Summer time reading packs of the defence ministers and Chiefs of Staff.[13] The then Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup, picked up the theme at the annual CDS speech at RUSI in 2009[14] and others followed, beginning with Paul Newton, Paul Colley and Andrew Sharpe in the RUSI Journal in 2010 and culminating with Chris Elliott's 2015 book *High Command* which missed the point in large measure.[15]

In examining these responses, Tim Edmunds in 'The defence dilemma in Britain' concluded:

> While a series of shocks have destabilized existing policy, created various competing notions of contradiction and crisis, and prompted ad hoc cost-saving measures from the government itself, the political and ideational struggle over the future contours of British defence is still unresolved.[16]

The majority of articles in *International Affairs* on British defence policy-making and implementation have focused on political and institutional drivers. The fourth contribution selected for this virtual issue, Trevor Taylor's 2012 'The limited capacity of management to rescue UK defence policy: a review and a word of caution', is significant because it critically evaluates the long-held assumption that reform of the management of British defence automatically generates the economies and efficiencies necessary to balance defence policy aspirations with limited budgetary resources.[17]

Theme 2: defence reviews

For *International Affairs,* the study of specific defence (and security) reviews has been a relatively new, post-Cold War phenomenon. It began in 1993 with then fifth contribution to this edition: Philip Sabin's 1990–91 'Options for Change' process that marked the UK's response to the first tranche of post-Cold War defence expenditure reductions.[18] Sabin identified that such reviews are rapidly overtaken when he said:

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[11] Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, 'Blair's wars and Brown's budgets: from strategic defence review to strategic decay in less than a decade', *International Affairs* 85: 2, March 2009, pp. 247–61.
[12] Cornish and Dorman, Blair's wars and Brown's budgets', p. 261.
[13] Hew Strachan, 'The strategy gap in British defence policy', *Survival* 51: 4, Aug. 2009, pp. 49–70.
[14] Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, 'Chief of the Defence Staff Lectures', RUSI, 3 Dec. 2009, https://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E4B184DB05C4E3/, accessed 20 May 2015.
[15] Paul Newton, Paul Colley and Andrew Sharpe, 'Reclaiming the art of British strategic thinking', *The RUSI Journal* 155: 1, Feb. 2010, pp. 44–50; Christopher L. Elliott, *High Command: British military leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars* (London: Hurst & Co., 2015).
[16] Tim Edmunds, 'The defence dilemma in Britain', *International Affairs* 86: 2, March 2010, p. 394; See also Jamie Gaskarth, 'Strategizing Britain's role in the world', *International Affairs* 90: 3, 2014, pp. 525–39.
[17] Trevor Taylor, 'The limited capacity of management to rescue UK defence policy: a review and a word of caution', *International Affairs* 88: 2, March 2012, pp. 223–42.
[18] Philip A. G. Sabin, 'British defence choices beyond 'Options for Change', *International Affairs* 69: 2, April 1993, pp. 267–87; Tom King, 'Statement on Defence (Options for Change)', *House of Commons Parliamentary Debates*, 25 July 1990, cols. 468–86; 'Frontline first: the cefence costs study' (London: HMSO, 1994).

> Even though it will be some time yet before *Options for Change* is fully implemented, there is an urgent need for debate about what is to follow. The financial sustainability of the *Options* force structure is far from assured, and Britain faces very difficult choices as to how it will address this issue in the later 1990s.[19]

The subsequent 1994 'Frontline first: the defence costs study' review was not specifically examined in *International Affairs*. Instead, it was Labour's 1998 Strategic Defence Review[20] which was examined in detail in the sixth article in this edition by Colin McInnes. This set the benchmark for subsequent examination and evaluation of British defence reviews. Its legacy has been an ongoing debate over whether the 1998 Strategic Defence Review process and outcome represents an ideal-type approach that should be emulated, or a failed policy review that was inherently unaffordable.[21]

By way of contrast our seventh contribution, Cornish and Dorman's 2009 'National defence in the age of austerity' article sought to place the then-forthcoming 2010 defence review in a more realistic economic and political context.[22] This developed further arguments presented in the earlier 2009 'Blair's wars and Brown's budgets' and was a response to demands placed on the authors for answers. Unlike earlier contributions, this article suggested that the financial position in which the UK found itself meant that defence was likely to be faced by real cuts, not just reductions in the level of increase in the defence budget and floated the idea that defence spending could fall below 2 per cent of GDP even before this became a NATO litmus test. It questioned the degree to which Britain's military had really transformed and highlighted how the armed forces were becoming increasingly top-heavy—an issue that subsequently featured in the 2010 Prime Ministerial debates.

Our eighth contribution, the follow-on article 'Breaking the mould: the United Kingdom Strategic Defence Review 2010' then looked back at all the post-1945 defence reviews and introduced the 'Groundhog Day Cycle' model, which demonstrated that defence policy has been captured by a never ending cycle of defence reviews caused largely by the manner in which successive governments have undertaken these reviews. The four-stage cycle was the first real attempt since Baylis's work in the mid-1980s to provide a framework for analysing the formation and implementation of British defence reviews.[23] The ninth article brings these analyses of the various defence reviews up to date in Tim Edmunds' 'Complexity, strategy and the national interest', which highlights the dilemmas of defence reviews for those enacting policy, and in 'Complex security and strategic latency: the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015', which identifies a series of 'non-ferous' laws of defence reviews and sets out a new basis for thinking.[24]

Theme 3: civil–military–society relations

During the past decade the relationship between the United Kingdom's armed forces, state and society has re-emerged as an area of controversy. *International Affairs* has played a leading role in this emerging debate. The idea of the 'military covenant' first put forward by Anthony Forster in

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[19] Sabin, 'British defence choices beyond 'Options for Change', p. 286.
[20] Colin McInnes, 'Labour's strategic defence review, *International Affairs* 74: 4, Oct. 1998, pp. 823–45.
[21] Colin McInnes, 'Labour's Strategic Defence Review', p. 845. Interestingly, the mythology of how perfect the 1998 review was continues. For recent examples of the perpetuation of this myth see Jonathan Shaw, *Britain in a perilous world: the Strategic Defence and Security Review we need* (London: Haus Publishing, 2014)
[22] Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, 'National defence in the age of austerity', *International Affairs* 85: 4, July 2009, pp. 733–53.
[23] Paul Cornish and Andrew M. Dorman, 'Breaking the mould: the United Kingdom Strategic defence review 2010', *International Affairs* 86: 2, March 2010, pp. 395–410.
[24] Timothy Edmunds, 'Complexity, strategy and the national interest' International Affairs 90: 3, 2014; Cornish and Dorman, 'Complex security and strategic latency', pp. 351–70.

an article in *International Affairs*[25] was subsequently developed and expanded upon by Tim Edmunds and Anthony Forster in a paper for the think-tank Demos.[26] Taking this a step further in the tenth article in this edition, Helen McCartney then examined the relationship of the military with the society from which they are drawn and highlighted how the military have created a totem by which they themselves measure society's commitment to them and their expectations of what the state should provide.[27]

Tim Edmunds has subsequently examined how the idea of risk, embraced in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security review, impacts on civil—military relations. Highlighting how the discourse of risk has entered western thinking he concluded that 'For the UK, the logic of risk poses a profound challenge to traditional patterns of strategy-making and civil–military relations'.[28] These issues had been alluded to in various biographies and commentaries on the British experience of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan but Edmunds' article, included as eleventh in this virtual issue, emphasised the much more profound and ill-considered consequences of the adoption of the risk narrative.

The other big issue to emerge within the civil–military relations field has been what Anthony Forster, writing for *International Affairs* in 2012, called the 'juridification of the armed forces' (included here as the twelfth article). This argued that the military court-martial system was being altered by civil judgments and, in particular, the impact of the adoption in 1998 of the Human Rights Act.[29] He highlighted the role of coroners responsible for processing the return of the military dead from Iraq and Afghanistan in holding the government and individual officers to account for their decisions to a degree not previously seen. The British armed forces and government were slow to respond to this and it is now noticeable how senior retired officers are campaigning for this legislation to be repealed.

Theme 4: nuclear debates

The analysis in *International Affairs* of nuclear matters and the evolution of the British nuclear deterrent in particular have been a continuing theme. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor's 'The place of the bomber in British policy' started the journals interest in aspects of British defence policy and also reflected the early dominance of practitioners in debates on defence policy. In his 1953 text re-published here as the thirteenth article, Sir John emphasised the deterrent role for the bomber in preventing Hot War between East and West.[30] He argued that the role of strategic air power continued to be misunderstood by the European members of NATO and that:

> The aim of Western policy is not primarily to be ready to win a war with the world in ruins— though we must be as ready as possible to do that if it is forced upon us by accident or miscalculation. It is the prevention of war. The bomber holds out to us the greatest, perhaps the only, hope of that. It is the great deterrent.[31]

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[25] Anthony Forster, 'Breaking the covenant: governance of the British Army in the 21st century', *International Affairs* 82: 6, 2006, pp. 1043–57.
[26] Tim Edmunds and Anthony Forster, *Out of step: the case for change in the British armed forces* (London: Demos, Nov. 2007).
[27] Helen McCartney, 'The military covenant and the civil–military contract in Britain', *International Affairs* 86: 2, 2010, p. 427.
[28] Timothy Edmunds, 'British civil–military relations and the problem of risk', *International Affairs* 88: 2, March 2012, p. 280.
[29] Anthony Forster, 'British judicial engagement and the juridification of the armed forces', *International Affairs* 88: 2, March 2012, pp. 283–300.
[30] John Slessor, 'The place of the bomber in British policy' *International Affairs* 29: 3, July 1953, p. 302.
[31] Slessor, 'The place of the bomber', p.304.

The background to Sir John's article was the adoption of the 1952 version of the 'Defence and Global Strategy Paper' by the Cabinet in secret and its rebalancing of British forces towards tackling what were termed both Hot and Cold War scenarios.[32] The former effectively equated to 'World War 3' and the latter to the various 'lesser' conflicts across the globe, such as the Korean War and Malayan Emergency. This rebalancing had led to some calling for the United Kingdom to abandon the development of the V-bomber force—its first generation of nuclear delivery system— in favour of more traditional defence capabilities and in particular army divisions, tactical air forces and naval forces.

In countering this argument Sir John's article also articulated the second traditional argument for the United Kingdom developing and maintaining a nuclear capability— maintaining its place in the world:

> If we threw away our bomber force, then in peace, in the cold war, we could lose what influence we have (and it is still important) on American policy and strategic planning, And, if it came to hot war, we would have little or no say in the direction of Allied strategy or in the determination of terms of peace. We would be just one of the minor Powers.[33]

The relevance and value of the British nuclear deterrent has been examined on a number of occasions after this piece. In the two decades that followed Slessor's original article Alfred Goldberg examined the origins of the British nuclear capability in two articles, Alastair Buchan—one of the founders of the IISS—considered the debate on the proposed Multinational Force and John Strachey considered how vulnerable the UK's airborne deterrent was.[34] Then a hiatus in articles followed which tallied with the replacement of the first generation V-bombers with the navy's Polaris equipped submarines.[35] Even the decision in 1980 by the Thatcher government to replace the Polaris equipped boats with a new generation of boats equipped with the Trident submarine launched ballistic missile was not discussed in *International Affairs*.

Instead, the renaissance of published articles on the United Kingdom's nuclear capabilities began in 2004 with Michael Clarke's 'Does my bomb look big in this? Britain's nuclear choices after Trident', included as the fourteenth contribution in this edition.[36] This was followed by a whole special issue devoted to the question of nuclear replacement, which included two articles by the late Sir Michael Quinlan, a former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, and often referred to as the godfather of British nuclear strategy.[37] In his first contribution, Sir Michael identified the two traditional schools of thinking— proponents for and against the United Kingdom retaining a nuclear deterrent—and the potential emergence of a third school comprising those who had originally been in favour of nuclear weapons, but now questioned

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[32] 'Defence Policy and Global Strategy', Report by the Chiefs of Staff to the Cabinet Defence Committee Reviewing the strategic situation', *CAB 131/9, DO(50)45*, 7 June 1950, National Archives reproduced in John Kent, ed., *Egypt and the defence of the Middle East: British documents on the end of empire Series B Volume 4 Part III 1949-53* (London: TSO, 1998), pp. 33–51.

[33] Slessor, 'The place of the bomber', p. 305.

[34] Alfred Goldberg, 'The military origins of the British nuclear deterrent', *International Affairs* 40: 4, Oct. 1964, pp. 600–618; Alfred Goldberg, 'The atomic origins of the British nuclear deterrent', *International Affairs* 40: 3, July 1964, pp. 409–31; Alastair Buchan, 'The multilateral force—a study in alliance politics', *International Affairs* 40: 4, Oct. 1964, pp. 619–37.

[35] See Humphrey Wynn, *RAF nuclear deterrent forces* (London: TSO, 1994); Kristan Stoddart, *Losing an empire and finding a role: Britain, the USA, NATO and nuclear weapons, 1964-70* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

[36] Michael Clarke. Does my bomb look big in this? Britain's nuclear choices after Trident, *International Affairs* 80: 1, Jan. 2004, pp. 49–62.

[37] Michael Quinlan, 'The future of United Kingdom nuclear weapons: shaping the debate', *International Affairs* 82 4, 2006, pp. 627–37.

whether their retention was worth the relative loss in conventional capability. This argument was subsequently picked up by Nick Ritchie in an article written in 2009.[38]

Theme 5: The impact of outside 'events' - Scottish Independence referendum and Brexit

The last area of focus in *International Affairs* has resulted from national events with the potential for seismic effects on British defence and security policy. Here the results of Britain's two recent referendums standout.

The first was the former Coalition government's decision to hold a referendum on independence in Scotland. In all, the journal published three major articles. The first, 'More than a storm in a teacup: the defence and security implications of Scottish independence' had a significant response both within traditional media and social media. Included as the fifteenth article in this edition, it highlighted that in defence and security terms, independence would have a profound security and defence impact for both Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom to an extent that few had considered.[39] Moreover, it identified a series of risks and challenges for both parties, the relative lack of information and the consequences for other states and organizations such as NATO and the EU. Two more articles provided further contributions to the debate.[40] Despite the 'no' vote in the Scottish independence referendum, uncertainties surrounding the longer-term implications of the vote received by the Scottish National Party in the 2015 General Election and the potential implications of the 2017 referendum on continued UK membership of the European Union suggest that the defence and security implications of any future fragmentation of the Union will remain firmly on the academic research agenda.

The second referendum undertaken on 23 June 2016 concerned the United Kingdom's continued membership of the European Union. In this case the electorate voted to leave the EU. Not surprisingly, there were a number of articles on the possible outcomes of a 'Brexit' in *International Affairs* in the run up to the vote.[41] However, there was only one that focused specifically on the prospects for post-Brexit UK and EU defence. In their May 2016 piece, Uttley and Wilkinson addressed the primary cases for and against a Brexit for defence procurement and industries in the UK and the EU member states.[42] Their approach drew on Jozef Bátora's 'institutional logics' framework to identify two pro-Brexit and two pro-Remain narratives, each employing differing assumptions about the relative benefits of national sovereignty and closer EU integration in defence procurement and industrial policy. The article concluded that the national security battleground in the 2016 referendum would be fought over competing narratives and arguments, partly because there was a dearth of evidence and data concerning UK and EU defence procurement and industries, which rendered this crucial area of national security vulnerable to the politics and spin. Prime Minister May's lack of clarity over the meaning of 'Brexit means Brexit' currently raises more questions than answers. The ongoing relevance of Uttley and Wilkinson's contribution, included as the sixteenth article in this edition, lies in its identification of what differing potential Brexit scenarios might mean for the UK's future

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[38] Nick Ritchie, 'Deterrence dogma? Challenging the relevance of British nuclear weapons', *International Affairs* 85: 1, 2009, pp. 81–98.

[39] Andrew M. Dorman, 'More than a storm in a teacup: the defence and security implications of Scottish independence', *International Affairs* 90:3, May 2014.

[40] William Walker, 'International reactions to the Scottish referendum', *International Affairs* 90: 4, July 2014, pp. 743–59; Colin Fleming, 'After independence? The challenges and benefits of Scottish–UK defence cooperation', *International Affairs* 90: 4, July 2014, pp. 761–71.

[41] See, for example, Richard G Whitman, 'Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK's European diplomatic strategy', *International Affairs* 92: 3, May 2016, pp. 509-29; Tim Oliver & Michel John Williams, 'Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the US-EU and US-UK relationships', *International Affairs* 92: 3, May 2016, pp.547-67.

[42] Matthew R.H. Uttley & Benedict Wilkinson, 'A spin of the wheel? Defence procurement and defence industries in the Brexit debates', *International Affairs* 92:3, May 2016, pp. 569-586

defence procurement options and its defence trading relationships with the remaining 27 European Union member states.

Conclusion

This introductory article suggests that the notion of learning from the past will be essential as policy makers and practitioners formulate the forthcoming 2015 SDSR. The results of the bibliometric survey presented here demonstrate the central role that *International Affairs* has played as a locus for academic research and debate into British defence and security policy, as well as the impact it has had in shaping thinking in Whitehall and beyond. The articles selected for this virtual issue are intended to highlight the sustained intellectual and evidence-based contributions made by generations of academics and practitioners in developing understanding of key sub-themes in the British defence and security policy debate.

Appendix 1: Full list of peer-reviewed journals identified in the bibliometric survey

'Core' journals

International Affairs (1922–date)
Survival (1959–date)
The Political Quarterly (1930–date)
Defence (& Security) Analysis (1985–date)
Defence Studies (2001–date)
Journal of Strategic Studies (1978–date)
Contemporary Security Policy (1979–date)
Public Administration (1923–date)
Round Table (1910–date)
Foreign Affairs (1924–date)
British Journal of Politics and International Relations (1999–date)
European Security (1992–date)
Review of International Studies (1981–date)/British Journal of International Studies (1975-1980)
Security Dialogue (1970–date)
Defence (& Peace) Economics (1990–date)
Armed Forces & Society (1974–date)

'Non-core' journals

Government and Opposition (1966–date)
Political Studies (1953–date)
Public Money & Management (1981–date)
Journal of Contemporary History (1966–date)
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History (1972–date)
Orbis (1956–date)
Scottish Journal of Political Economy (1954–date)
Security Studies (1991–date)
Twentieth Century British History (1990–date)
Cambridge Review of International Affairs (1986–date)
Contemporary British History (1987–date)
International Journal (1946–date)
International Relations Journal (1954–date)
Medicine, Conflict & Survival (1985–date)
Nature (1869–date)
Science & Public Policy (1974–date)
The Historical Journal (1958–date)
American Political Science Review (1906–date)
Business History Review (1926–date)
Cold War History (2000–date)
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics (1961–date)
Comparative Strategy (1978–date)
Diplomacy & Statecraft (1990–date)
Diplomatic History (1977–date)
Economic Affairs (1980–date)
Engineering Cost & Production Economics (1980–date)
English Historical Review (1886–date)
European History Quarterly (1971–date)
European Review of History (1994–date)

Historical Research (1923–date)
History (1916–date)
Industrial Relations Journal (1970–date)
International Journal of Defense Acquisition & Management (2008–date)
International Journal of Industrial Organization (1983–date)
International Politics (1963–date)
International Studies (1959–date)
Journal of (Current) Southeast Asian Affairs (1971–date)
Journal of Applied Economics (1968–date)
Journal of British Studies (1962–date)
Journal of Common Market Studies (1962–date)
Journal of Peace Research (1964–date)
Local Economy (1986–date)
Long Range Planning (1968–date)
Parameters (1970–date)
Parliamentary Affairs (1937–date)
Political Research Quarterly (1948–date)
Regional Studies (1967–date)
Review of Economics & Statistics (1907–date)
Review of International Affairs (2002–date)
RUSI Defence Systems (2004–date)
Southeastern Political Review (now Politics and Policy) (1973–date)
Strategic Change (1992–date)
The International History Review (1979–date)
The Journal of European Economic History (1972–date)
The Journal of Legislative Studies (1995–date)
The Journal of Politics (1939–date)
The Nonproliferation Review (1993–date)
The Review of Politics (1939–date)
The Western Political Quarterly (1923–date)
War & Society (1983–date)
War in History (1994–date)